As the German election approaches, the frontrunner to become Chancellor Friedrich Merz is trying to find footing amid rising popularity of the ultra-rightwing, populist AfD party by ceding ground on immigration reform, to the chagrin of many of his current and former allies. Meanwhile in the U.S., since the election of rightwing populist Donald Trump to the presidency, opposition parties have been largely paralyzed, unable to land on a coherent message or action to rally the public, while the administration embarks on a de facto and arguably unpopular dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development.
Faced with populist attacks and isolationist policy, it seems from these examples that the proponents of development cooperation are ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t.’ At the recent Development Engagement Lab partner meeting in Berlin, members of the German overseas aid sector came together with academics to discuss just that: the popularity of anti-aid rhetoric in a public discourse that is increasingly populist, isolationist and distrustful of so-called ‘experts.’ Joining the discussion as a special guest was Professor Michael Zürn, Director of the Global Governance Research Unit at the Berlin Social Science Center and Professor of International Relations at the Free University Berlin.
Professor Zürn has kindly agreed to share an edited version of his comments and the ensuing discussion with meeting participants.
Professor Zürn: Starting out with one of the Dashboard findings, we see that 53% [of the German public] want to keep or increase the overseas aid budget in Germany. This gives us some optimism that we are missing these days. In that sense, this data is important. However, this 53% percentage number is hiding two things: on the one end, that politics is practically always about conflicting goals. The moment overseas aid pops up in the political space, someone will point out that aid is [in conflict with] another goal, let’s say [having] no national debt. In that sense it can be easily used politically. The meaning of those numbers is therefore limited as long as it’s asked in a context without conflicting goals or issues. Even more important, 47% [who are in return in support of reducing aid] is still a lot of people. We are talking about [supporters of] authoritarian populists like Trump voters and many others. In Germany, AfD supporters amount to probably half of those 47%. This brings me to our question: How can we break into a communication space with those people? How can we reach them? I want to approach the issue from two perspectives. The first one is, taking a closer look at the political ideology of what I would label authoritarian populists. With the age of globalization, the 20th century political space was a one-dimensional one between rightist and leftist political forces, social democratic and socialist parties on one side and conservative and liberal parties on the other, essentially meaning capital vs. labour. This sort of cleavage structured most western societies after WW II.
Global poverty reduction is [an] easier [way] to enter a debate than with those people in denial of climate change.
The argument is that it became a two-dimensional political space with globalization. In addition to the left/right distinction a second dimensions was added: let’s call it openness vs. ‘closedness,’ or cosmopolitans and nationalists or liberals and authoritarians. Why do I use cleavage theory? Because it points out, that if you have cleavages, people on one side of the cleavage take very similar positions on a whole set of issues that are not logically related. Regarding the new cleavage, we have the same people on the side of anti-immigration, anti-vaccination, anti-EU, no weapons for Ukraine. These things really do not belong together, and that has something to do with the underlying ideologies that bind together these issues. Understanding the core beliefs of authoritarian populists is key to communication. These movements are characterized by anti-elitism, a focus on the silent majority versus experts, anti-pluralism, strong nationalism, and a rejection of international institutions, especially the EU. They often reject democratic processes, believing they know what’s best for the people. Some argue that “authoritarian populism” may not be the best term, as these movements aren’t questioning democracy itself but targeting the rational state, aligning more with patrimonialism—using political power to enrich themselves. If you take those [associated] issues and look now at our major themes today – climate change and global poverty – they are of course very related to core elements of this ideology. Climate change is connected to the rejection of expertise, rejection of international institutions. Development aid also has to do with international organizations, for accepting some responsibility for people outside of national borders. Taking just those two issues into consideration, I would still think that global poverty reduction is [an] easier [way] to enter a debate than with those people in denial of climate change. Taking this approach, one [should choose] those that are less associated with those ideological core elements [as entry points.]
There is a second approach. It starts with existing explanations for why people choose authoritarian populist parties: we have the urban-rural divide and a sense of economic deprivation, people who feel detached from the political system and sense of democratic alienation, and we have those who don’t like cultural change, and feel a need for cultural backlash. These three approaches together explain something. But in the end, they do not explain 50% support for Trump. For many people who voted for Trump it seems still completely irrational to vote for Trump, right? And that is the sort of gap that we still have in accounting for such a victory, and which leaves us still speechless. This a current project of mine: According to my still ongoing research it is a deliberate strategy of populist authoritarian movements to undermine the social epistemology of liberal democracies. The argument is that modern liberal democracies have developed a certain epistemology to assess on the societal level what is true and false, right and wrong. That gives a role for critical citizens, for public debate and for science. It’s a complicated interaction of those three sources of truth. What we can observe, especially looking at the American case, it has a lot to do with the systematic attempt to undermine the recognition and working of this social epistemology. I identify a set of moves: the Conway move, is essentially to reject the falsification principle, which is part of the liberal truth regime. The Marlboro move is a strategy taken from the tobacco industry in the 1950s and 60s, when there was a lot of clear evidence that smoking was unhealthy, but the industry just emphasized, ‘Hey, we cannot be sure,’ and therefore please continue smoking this unhealthy product. We currently see the same pattern with respect to climate change and the fossil industry.
Then there’s something like the ‘I did my own research’ move, the basic idea that as a simple individual I can handle the data and know what’s going on. These are tactics used to undermine a specific liberal social epistemology which constructs the truth-based society. At the same time, I would argue that this is the social epistemology that is vernunftbegabt and associated with reason and rationality, and there we have our major communication problem, because they try to undermine rationality and we continue to try to argue in a rational way. So that leaves you to uncover these strategies, to show what they do.
Arguing that [the populists] are undemocratic is difficult, as they frame their actions as fulfilling democracy—mobilizing the voices of those often unheard.
Question: One of the arguments is to try and point out these strategies. Just to play devil’s advocate, one of the things the [Kamala] Harris campaign tried to do, they said Trump and his folks want to destroy democracy, and if you vote for them you will see how democracy will be destroyed, if you want to keep the system as it is, vote for me. That didn’t stick, did it? I think you have a similar experience in Germany, with the AfD.
Professor Zürn: It might be more effective to analyze the argumentative strategy used to undermine the public’s ability to make rational decisions, rather than simply claiming they undermine democracy. Why? Because their argument is strong: “We are democracy.” They claim to represent the silent majority by putting their concerns on the political agenda. Arguing that they are undemocratic is difficult, as they frame their actions as fulfilling democracy—mobilizing the voices of those often unheard. Therefore, the accusation of being undemocratic isn’t as persuasive as we might hope, which isn’t surprising.
Question: Let’s take a look at the emotional argument. There are lots of people who point to cultural or emotional effects around why people feel less included in 21st century society, that even feel insulted because the current system doesn’t recognize them the way they feel society should, and this is probably part of the success of the Trump campaign: ‘You guys are great, you deserve better, the elites look down on you.’ Olaf Schulz, in 2021, he ran on respect. And even though that might feel a bit funny now, he won the election. And maybe that worked to a certain degree. So how do you talk with someone who feels insulted, and who doesn’t feel a part of the debate anymore?
Professor Zurn: Emotions are undeniably important, but I’m skeptical of pitting emotion against rationality. They are closely interconnected. Regaining rationality also means better controlling emotions, as those who control emotions hold power. Emotions like feeling excluded or insulted are rooted in real experiences of exclusion and disrespect. Without rational arguments, you can’t address these emotions. For me, emotions and rationality are linked, and this idea aligns with a liberal social epistemology, possibly tracing back to Kant, that includes an emotional aspect within rationality. So, while I understand your point, I would avoid contrasting emotions and rationality.
Question: We saw the numbers presented about [the public’s perceived low] effectiveness of the state: Not just government but also administration. And this I believe is something people experience every day, everyone does. You try to get an appointment with the registration office and it takes five months. The government plans a bridge, and needs seven years. Or, you report a burglary to the police and for nine months you never hear anything back. People feel the state is failing in its core functions, and that might also be a disappointment, that makes people start to look elsewhere. Is it that simple? Maybe we should just get the state back into its core functions and we will win some people back?
Professor Zürn: Yes, you’re right that people, particularly those more tied to their locality, want a state that functions at least sometimes. In Germany, for example, two decades of coalition government led to systematic underinvestment, as one side wanted social spending and the other opposed debt. The ensuing systematic underinvestment in public infrastructure has led to increasing dissatisfaction and a shift toward authoritarian options. A survey across 46 countries revealed that the key factor in support for the “liberal script” is not inequality or democracy, but whether people have equal access to basic goods like education, security, and public services. When people lack this equal access, they tend to turn away from liberal ideals.
The degree of bullshitting, as Harry Frankfurt defines it—where the speaker doesn’t care about the truth—is a key tactic used by authoritarian populists to undermine reality. It’s not about lying; it’s about creating a performative act detached from truth.
Question: In terms of tactics, the biggest drop in [aid] support over the last 12 months was initiated partly by the AfD, using some absurd figures around bicycle paths in Peru, but I think it was actually lost in the discourse because KFW and BMZ weren’t actually able to defend the space on clear figures. But then they weren’t actually able to showcase this is saving so-and-so much CO2, which would have been the proof point for this investment. Are we trying to win some of them over, or is that actually possible? For example, pointing to development cooperation as a means of deterring migration. The other thing, you could also use the moral high ground, and different organizations can take different tacks. What do you think of this?
Professor Zürn: I agree, but it’s clear that attacks on liberal epistemology have been more successful in the U.S. than in Germany. This is why even the AfD in Germany is hesitant to go too far. The degree of bullshitting, as Harry Frankfurt defines it—where the speaker doesn’t care about the truth—is a key tactic used by authoritarian populists to undermine reality. It’s not about lying; it’s about creating a performative act detached from truth. This is something we must resist, though it may not be possible in the U.S. right now.
Question: When you say that [populists] are attacking the liberal script of liberal democracy, [do you mean] elites on the authoritarian side, and the mass public are tapping into something they couldn’t articulate but feel very profoundly, or are you suggesting that it’s an actual conscious decision on the part of citizens who say, I see what’s happening around me and I’m being proactive in rejecting that? To me that contrasts with an approach that says rather than at a citizen level, rejecting the liberal script, what I’m really reacting to and is being reinforced by populist leaders, is a lack of control, certainty and security, and maybe just not feeling like things are getting done anymore. I wonder if it’s coming from a more proactive rejection of a particular type of ideology, or more of a feeling of a deficit model, whether that’s a deficit in the cultural domain or an economic domain.
Professor Zürn: The latter more than the former. There is growing dissatisfaction, growing sense of exclusion, there is growing sense of ineffectiveness and of not solving the problems anymore. It is a diffuse mood, and there are political entrepreneurs that are taking up this ideology. We get to this debate around whether it’s really authoritarian populism or if it is something more like patrimonialism. Anyway, something that provides an offer and enters the political space, because it is an offer that hasn’t been taken up by the mainstream parties. In that sense, one implication of what you say, besides the sort of strategies I was talking about, it might also be a good strategy to think about alternative offers, democratic offers, progressive offers, to take up the feeling of those people.
When I suggest addressing strategies that undermine rationality in communication, my immediate sense is that it’s better to engage with questions and foster critical thinking, rather than simply confronting people with statements that position us as the sole holders of truth.
Question: You started from the point that all politics is about contestation and so that’s where we need to locate our understanding of what’s going on. There’s all this research that says if you can test somebody’s reality, you likely strengthen it, and there’s this backlash effect. You’re encouraging us to think about an argumentative strategy that doesn’t try and fight what we call bullshitting, or the Big Tobacco strategy by competing with [their tactics using] facts or rationality. In the UK, people like Nigel Farage, that’s exactly what he does, he just asks questions. He just puts those questions in other people’s heads, they go away, and it starts to undermine trust. There was some research done in California around same-sex marriage, where they didn’t try to change people’s minds, they just asked them questions, and those questions reduced their confidence in their own position, which allowed them to change their own mind. And only at that point did they feel like they could, because they were no longer in a defensive place. Do you think that, as a communications strategy, is the place we should be going in? And to the room, it’s a one-person approach, and laborious, time consuming, so is it even viable?
Professor Zürn: I agree with your point. When I suggest addressing strategies that undermine rationality in communication, my immediate sense is that it’s better to engage with questions and foster critical thinking, rather than simply confronting people with statements that position us as the sole holders of truth.
