


DEL DASHBOARD

11 tracked measures, four statistically significant changes since November 2025. Data reflects every wave since 2019.

▲ WHAT MOVED: FOUR SIGNIFICANT CHANGES



► EVERYTHING ELSE: NO SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT



■ HOW ENGAGED IS THE PUBLIC?


Totally Disengaged has led every wave since 2019, now 37%. Purposively Engaged has shrunk, Marginally Engaged has grown.



WHAT WORRIES THE PUBLIC

The economy has pulled clear of everything else

Every issue DEL tracks, since 2019. Five are picked out: the economy (57%, +8pp) now sits well above immigration (43%) and war (41%), while concern for developing countries (21%) is up this wave but still far below its 2024 peak.





Share ranking each issue among their top three concerns, Great Britain. Grey lines are DEL's other tracked issues.

HOW BRITAIN COMPARES

Britain's problem is not that people stopped caring. It is that they don't believe aid works.

The same four measures across France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States. Britain is the floor on support (46%) and on whether aid is effective (19%, eight points below the next country), but sits second on concern, above France and Germany.



Each panel one measure, each line one country, every wave since 2019.

Though public pessimism is high (86%), the public feel more connected than ever to the developing world.

50%

of Britons feel developing countries affect them too, the highest share DEL has recorded since tracking began in 2019.

+4pp since November, an all-time high

WHAT HASN'T CAUGHT UP

Trust in NGOs sits at a five-year low this wave (26%). **The open question:** where do people turn to help them understand their connection to the world?

DIGGING DEEPER

Connection is rising on both sides of the argument: a marker of attention, not a direction of travel

Nearly half of the people who feel connected do not support aid spending, and that has been true for a year.


Who moved: the young

Change in % connected, by age (pp)



Does connection cause support?

Barely: % who grew more supportive, $p = .11$



Whose connection? Both camps, same rate

% of all adults connected | teal = also supports aid, amber = does not | $p = .98$



IS IT REAL?

Yes, and understated. **+4.1pp** ($p = .003$), surviving correction across 123 tests.

Tracker-to-tracker it is **+6.3pp**.

WHO MOVED?

Not Britain alone: also the U.S. and France. Within Britain it is generational, **18 to 24s up 18.6pp**, and flat over 55.

WHOSE CONNECTION?

Both supporters and opponents, at indistinguishable rates. **22.7% of adults are connected but do not support aid**, and have been for a year.

DOES CONNECTION CAUSE SUPPORT?

Across people, strongly. **Within the same people, barely**. Of those who became connected, **12.4%** grew more supportive, against **10.9%** of those who stayed unconnected ($p = .11$).


THE QUESTION *If connection is growing just as fast among people who oppose aid, what exactly is being mobilised when it occurs?*

What this cannot tell us. The within-person test uses the most recent Panel pair (Sep 2024 to Nov 2025), because a Tracker round carries no panel identifiers; it speaks to the mechanism, not to this wave's rise. Sub-groups are a pre-specified list, run and reported in full; bases under 100 are suppressed. **Also tested, not significant.** The rise is no larger among people ranking immigration top-three (+5.3 vs +3.1, $p = .40$) or developing countries top-three (+2.7 vs +4.3, $p = .63$), and no party moved differentially ($p = .63$). These are the tests that would have told us what kind of connection is growing, and they don't.

DIGGING DEEPER, THE AID BUDGET

Support is where it started seven years ago. The divides underneath it remain.

Do people support current levels of ODA spending? **46%** back the aid budget, eighth lowest of twenty waves since 2019.



HAS SUPPORT MOVED?

No. **45.7%** this wave, and the seven-year trend is flat (-0.24pp a year, $p = .58$). The series has run between 43.5% and as high as 55.2%.

WHO BACKS THE AID BUDGET?

Party ID decides. **Green 69%, Labour 62%, Lib Dem 55%, Conservative 29%, Reform 15%**. Age is the next widest split at 25pp, then University at 16pp.

IS ANYTHING MOVING UNDERNEATH?

Yes, but not the divide. The groups changed by **different amounts** ($p = .02$, and $p = .015$ tracker to tracker). The movement is inside the pro-aid bloc: Lib Dems down 13pp, Greens up 6pp.

IS THE DIVIDE WIDENING?

No. **55.3pp** between the top and bottom party in 2019, **53.7pp** now. Two elections and the aid cuts have not narrowed or widened it.

THE QUESTION *If overall support cannot move while the political divide holds this wide, what would actually shift it?*

What this cannot tell us. Party is vote at the most recent general election, so July 2024 changed who sits in each group: the Lib Dem fall is more likely composition than conversion. Cells under 100 are suppressed, which is why the SNP and Plaid Cymru are not shown, and Green and Reform clear the base only in the larger Panel rounds. Social grade is in nineteen of twenty waves but not this one, so class is absent. **Also tested, not significant.** Education looked non-uniform against the 2019 Panel baseline ($p = .035$) but not against the mode-matched tracker baseline ($p = .69$), so it is not reported. Age, gender and region all moved uniformly.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Three hypotheses worth testing

Connection is the only attitude moving (50%, +4pp) while support sits at its floor (46%) and the economy dominates the public's worries (57%, +8pp).

Lead with connection

"What happens there affects us here" as a key message.

50% +4pp*



The only attitude moving, and a record high. But it did not make the same people more supportive, and nearly half the connected do not support aid. Perhaps feelings of connection are the first step toward caring.

UPSIDE

Can work with the cost-of-living mood rather than against it.

RISKS

Mutual interest framing can crowd out moral motivation, and connection does not drive support.

Attack the effectiveness deficit

Go after the belief that aid does not work.

19% +1pp



Stuck in a 17 to 23 band since 2019. It did not fall when support fell, and has not risen as connection rose.

UPSIDE

Addresses the doubt that stops support rising.

RISKS

Slow, and foregrounding doubt can reinforce it. NGO trust is at 26%, its lowest since 2021, so who is the right messenger right now?

Win back the engaged

Recapture the people who have drifted out, and stop more slipping.

34% -4.3pp since 2019*



A third of British adults are engaged at some level, around 18 million people. But the bloc has been shrinking since 2019, by about 0.7pp a year, and the losses are concentrated at its committed end.

UPSIDE

These people are one step over the border, not a cold audience.

RISKS

We don't know whether they are more drawn to the engaged or disengaged pole, people, or arguments.

DEL INSIGHTS

The whole DEL series. Now ask your question.

Every DEL Panel, Sandbox and Tracker survey behind a natural language question box. Four countries, **309,438 respondents across 106 waves**, May 2019 to July 2026. No variable names, no SPSS, no analyst in the loop.

ASK Is 'mutual benefits' a winning argument in Britain?

ASK Which age group's concern has dipped most, and since when?

TEST Feeling financially left behind reduces engagement.


HOW TO GET IN

DEL Insights is in build. Public launch **November 2026**.

Until then the full data are open at dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/panelsDEL

We are looking for beta testers for early access: email Molly at m.anders.1@bham.ac.uk

DEL Insights is a Development Engagement Lab platform, built with Elver Limited and supported by the Gates Foundation. Its query engine runs on the same deposited data you can download today.



WHY YOU CAN TRUST WHAT IT TELLS YOU

01 The AI never does the arithmetic. It picks the variables; every number is computed from the survey data, and every statistic is checked against it.

02 It shows the limits, not just the findings. Weighted percentage and unweighted base together, a warning under n=100, and a flag on any unfiled wave.

03 It tells you what it used. Every result carries its variables, how they were coded, which years they were asked, and the caveats that apply.